Most Discussions of Religious Pluralism Are Sloppy
Dr Muhammad (Gary Carl) Legenhausen in a lecture delivered at Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute discussed different aspects of religious pluralism and religious dialogue.
What follows is excerpts from his lecture:
There are many different forms of religious pluralism. One way to divide the types of religious pluralism is with respect to values. A religious pluralist with respect to some value holds that there is a plurality of religions that have this value. Examples of values that might be considered are truth, spirituality, salvation, a way to Nrivana, good moral teachings, good institutional organization, etc. Sometimes, the values are related to one another. If the truth will set you free, then the value of truth will enable one to achieve the value of liberation. The relations among values, however, are complex and they should not be confused.
Another way to divide types of religious pluralism is with regard to the extent to which different traditions have some given value. Hegel, for example, thought that spiritual value could be found in each of the major traditions of the world. But that Christianity, and in particular, Lutheran Christianity, and even more particularly Lutheran Christianity with Hegel’s own philosophical interpretation possesses this value in the highest degree.
We could say that Hegel is some sort of religious pluralist with regard to spiritual value because he is willing to grant that there is spiritual value in a variety of religions. But he is not an equality pluralist since he holds that the measure of this value increases in dialectical progression leading to his own religious views. We could call Hegel a degree pluralist.
Yet another division that may be made among religious pluralisms, is that they may be reductive or non-reductive. A reductive religious pluralist with respect to some value, holds that a plurality of religions possess this value because they share the same common elements.
Let’s take, for example, the often discussed value of salvation. Those who are religious pluralists in this regard hold that more than one religion provides a means to salvation. Usually it is claimed that the major religious traditions all provide a means to salvation. Equality pluralists hold that the various religious traditions they find acceptable all provide equally good ways of obtaining salvation. Equality pluralists with regard to salvation who are also reductive pluralists will hold that various religions provide equally good ways to salvation because of some common set of elements that they share. Suppose, for example, that two of these elements are what Rudolf Otto called the Mysterium tremendum et fascinans ( that is a mystery that evokes trembling in awe and one that evokes an overpowering attraction). Some might hold that any religion that has these two elements has sufficient means to provide the believer with a way to salvation.
It would not matter how much Mysterium tremendum et fascinans a religion has, maybe one religion is heavier on the tremendum side and another on the fascinans side, does not matter as long as the basic elements are present, there is a way to salvation. On the other hand, one might be a reductive pluralist with regard to salvation, but not an equality pluralist.
A degree pluralist will hold that as long as the basic elements are present, there is a way to salvation, but when the elements occur with the proper balance and with the right amount of intensity, one finds a religion with a better way to salvation. So one can be reductive equality pluralist or a reductive degree pluralist with regard to any of a variety of values that are attributed to some group of religions.
A non-reductive pluralist on the other hand, will hold that some value may be present in different religious traditions for different reasons. Consider three religious traditions: R1, R2, R3. It may be that R1has the salvation value because of elements E1, E2, and E3 each of which is needed on order of R1 to provide a way to salvation. R2 might have the salvation value because of elements E2, E3 and E4 each of which is needed by R2 to provide a way to salvation. In that case, there would be no common element shared by R1 and R2 that is sufficient in order to provide a way to heaven because each one needs an element that the other one lacks.
And maybe there would be another religion, R3, that provides an independent way to salvation by means of elements that are not found in any of the other religions. This sort of pluralist will be called a non-reductive pluralist because the elements by virtue of which several religions possess some value can not be reduced to what is shared among them. Needless to say a non-reductive pluralist may be an equality pluralist or a degree pluralist.
And one might well find all such discussion of ranking and measuring of elements to be misplaced. Equality and degree pluralisms are not the only options that are available for a religious pluralist. Another way of estimating the possession of some value among several different tradition sis to say that the amount of the value to be found in each of these traditions is incommensurable with the others.
So we can have a reductive incommensurability pluralist or a non-reductive incommensurability pluralist. In either case, the incommensurability pluralist will claim that there is some value V that can not be said to be possessed in an equal degree by several religions, nor in differing amounts because the measure of the value is incommensurable with its measuring other traditions, or it is not the sort of thing that can be measured or described in quantitative terms at all.
And since believers claim various merits for their own denominations, one might be some sort of pluralist with respect to one such merit and another kind of pluralist with regard to another and reject any kind of pluralism at all with regard to a third value.
Nevertheless, in most discussions of religious pluralism, the values are kind of lumped together. So I find most discussions of religious pluralism to be really sloppy.
There are many different forms of religious pluralism. One way to divide the types of religious pluralism is with respect to values. A religious pluralist with respect to some value holds that there is a plurality of religions that have this value. Examples of values that might be considered are truth, spirituality, salvation, a way to Nrivana, good moral teachings, good institutional organization, etc. Sometimes, the values are related to one another. If the truth will set you free, then the value of truth will enable one to achieve the value of liberation. The relations among values, however, are complex and they should not be confused.
Another way to divide types of religious pluralism is with regard to the extent to which different traditions have some given value. Hegel, for example, thought that spiritual value could be found in each of the major traditions of the world. But that Christianity, and in particular, Lutheran Christianity, and even more particularly Lutheran Christianity with Hegel’s own philosophical interpretation possesses this value in the highest degree.
We could say that Hegel is some sort of religious pluralist with regard to spiritual value because he is willing to grant that there is spiritual value in a variety of religions. But he is not an equality pluralist since he holds that the measure of this value increases in dialectical progression leading to his own religious views. We could call Hegel a degree pluralist.
Yet another division that may be made among religious pluralisms, is that they may be reductive or non-reductive. A reductive religious pluralist with respect to some value, holds that a plurality of religions possess this value because they share the same common elements.
Let’s take, for example, the often discussed value of salvation. Those who are religious pluralists in this regard hold that more than one religion provides a means to salvation. Usually it is claimed that the major religious traditions all provide a means to salvation. Equality pluralists hold that the various religious traditions they find acceptable all provide equally good ways of obtaining salvation. Equality pluralists with regard to salvation who are also reductive pluralists will hold that various religions provide equally good ways to salvation because of some common set of elements that they share. Suppose, for example, that two of these elements are what Rudolf Otto called the Mysterium tremendum et fascinans ( that is a mystery that evokes trembling in awe and one that evokes an overpowering attraction). Some might hold that any religion that has these two elements has sufficient means to provide the believer with a way to salvation.
It would not matter how much Mysterium tremendum et fascinans a religion has, maybe one religion is heavier on the tremendum side and another on the fascinans side, does not matter as long as the basic elements are present, there is a way to salvation. On the other hand, one might be a reductive pluralist with regard to salvation, but not an equality pluralist.
A degree pluralist will hold that as long as the basic elements are present, there is a way to salvation, but when the elements occur with the proper balance and with the right amount of intensity, one finds a religion with a better way to salvation. So one can be reductive equality pluralist or a reductive degree pluralist with regard to any of a variety of values that are attributed to some group of religions.
A non-reductive pluralist on the other hand, will hold that some value may be present in different religious traditions for different reasons. Consider three religious traditions: R1, R2, R3. It may be that R1has the salvation value because of elements E1, E2, and E3 each of which is needed on order of R1 to provide a way to salvation. R2 might have the salvation value because of elements E2, E3 and E4 each of which is needed by R2 to provide a way to salvation. In that case, there would be no common element shared by R1 and R2 that is sufficient in order to provide a way to heaven because each one needs an element that the other one lacks.
And maybe there would be another religion, R3, that provides an independent way to salvation by means of elements that are not found in any of the other religions. This sort of pluralist will be called a non-reductive pluralist because the elements by virtue of which several religions possess some value can not be reduced to what is shared among them. Needless to say a non-reductive pluralist may be an equality pluralist or a degree pluralist.
And one might well find all such discussion of ranking and measuring of elements to be misplaced. Equality and degree pluralisms are not the only options that are available for a religious pluralist. Another way of estimating the possession of some value among several different tradition sis to say that the amount of the value to be found in each of these traditions is incommensurable with the others.
So we can have a reductive incommensurability pluralist or a non-reductive incommensurability pluralist. In either case, the incommensurability pluralist will claim that there is some value V that can not be said to be possessed in an equal degree by several religions, nor in differing amounts because the measure of the value is incommensurable with its measuring other traditions, or it is not the sort of thing that can be measured or described in quantitative terms at all.
And since believers claim various merits for their own denominations, one might be some sort of pluralist with respect to one such merit and another kind of pluralist with regard to another and reject any kind of pluralism at all with regard to a third value.
Nevertheless, in most discussions of religious pluralism, the values are kind of lumped together. So I find most discussions of religious pluralism to be really sloppy.
