Rather, it is a strategic sign of the birth of a new concept of regional security based on diversifying sources of deterrence and reducing dependence on the American guarantor, Qassem al-Gharawi told IQNA in an interview, which is as follows:

IQNA - How do you assess the Mecca pact? Does this agreement indicate a decline in the ability of the United States to provide security to its allies?

I believe that the Mecca agreement does not necessarily mean the collapse of the US security umbrella, but it does indicate a decline in confidence in relying solely on American support. This is an important distinction.

The United States still maintains the largest military presence and has the largest intelligence, air, and naval capabilities in the region. It is therefore difficult to argue that Washington has lost its ability to protect its allies. However, recent developments have led some regional powers to conclude that relying on a single external power is no longer a sufficiently secure option.

The agreement can therefore be understood as a shift from the concept of “American support” to the concept of distributing deterrent resources. Saudi Arabia has financial and energy power; Turkey has a large army and a sophisticated defense industry; and Pakistan has military power, a special strategic location, and significant nuclear capabilities.

The most important message of the agreement, therefore, is not that the United States has been removed from the region, but that countries are saying that we will no longer be hostage to a security decision made solely by Washington. This in itself is a significant shift in the regional security architecture.

IQNA - Is Washington seeking to shift some of the burden of its military presence to regional powers through this agreement?

This is a possibility worth considering, but I do not see this agreement as simply an American project to reduce the US military burden. For years, the United States has been pressuring its regional allies and partners to shoulder a greater share of their security responsibilities, as the cost of direct military deployment has risen and Washington wants to maintain the ability to intervene in times of need without having to manage every crisis alone.

However, the Mecca agreement also has a dimension independent of Washington. The three countries have their own motives, and some of them want to reduce their dependence on the United States, rather than simply implement an American strategy.

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A more accurate interpretation, therefore, is that the agreement partly serves Washington’s preferred burden-sharing concept, but at the same time it reflects a regional effort to build self-reliant deterrence capabilities.

There is a paradox here: Washington may benefit from this agreement in the short term, but in the long term, it may find itself faced with a more independent regional security system.

IQNA - Is this agreement a response to the “resistance front” getting more powerful?

It can be seen as part of a response to the intensification of regional polarization, but reducing it solely to countering the “resistance front” would be an oversimplification. There are several overlapping motives here: Saudi Arabia’s concerns about Iranian threats, missiles, and drones; Turkey’s calculations regarding its regional security; and Pakistan’s interests regarding the security of the Persian Gulf and India and its place in the Muslim world.

Most importantly, this agreement is being reached in a security environment that has seen a relative decline in the ability of traditional arrangements to prevent conflict. Thus, the three countries are trying to increase the cost of any attack against them by expanding the scope of their response.

In other words, if the previous equation was based on one country being attacked, the new equation implies that you don't know in advance how many countries will join the confrontation. This is the principle of deterrence.

IQNA – Are we witnessing a shift from almost exclusive reliance on the United States to multiple regional security networks?

Yes, and in my opinion, this is the most important strategic consequence of this agreement. The region is gradually moving from a “single guarantor” model to a multi-network security model.

Saudi Arabia does not want to cut off its relationship with the United States; Turkey is a NATO member, and Pakistan has strategic relations with China, the United States, and the Persian Gulf states. Therefore, the goal is not to create a closed axis, but to create a wider strategic margin for maneuver.

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This is also in line with the broader political cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt that existed before the Mecca agreement and indicated a trend toward consultation on regional security. Therefore, this development can be described as a strategic diversification of security resources, not a complete separation from the United States.

IQNA – Can this agreement change the balance of power, despite the gaps between the three countries and the ambiguity of commitments?

Yes, but not immediately, and not necessarily in the way some imagine. The agreement has significant strengths:

Saudi Arabia: finances, energy, and geographic location.

Turkey: a large military, operational experience, and a sophisticated defense industry.

Pakistan: manpower, military power, strategic expertise, and strategic deterrence capabilities.

However, the fundamental weakness lies in the transition from a political agreement to a joint military capability. To date, there is no single military command like NATO, no joint air and missile defense system, and no single operational doctrine within the framework of the pact. This fundamental gap makes the agreement, in its current stage, more of a political-military deterrence framework than a full-fledged military alliance.

In addition, the different priorities of the three countries are crucial: Saudi Arabia focuses primarily on security in the Persian Gulf, Iran, and Yemen; Turkey has its own considerations in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean; and Pakistan’s strategy remains focused on India and the security of South Asia.

The real test of this agreement will therefore not be at the moment of signing, but in a crisis. What will happen if Saudi Arabia is attacked? Will Turkey and Pakistan intervene militarily? How much will their intervention be? Will it be air, intelligence, logistical, or ground? These questions remain virtually unanswered.

However, the Mecca agreement is not yet an “Islamic NATO” in the institutional sense, nor is it a purely symbolic agreement. It is a strategic sign of the birth of a new concept of regional security based on diversifying sources of deterrence and reducing dependence on the American guarantor.

Washington may benefit from burden-sharing in the initial phase, but at the same time it is facing a new reality: its allies have begun to build security capabilities that are not solely dependent on it.

Most importantly, the agreement should not be interpreted simply in terms of “against whom?” but rather in terms of a deeper perspective: who will control regional security in the future?

The importance of the Mecca Agreement lies precisely here; it could mark the beginning of a transition from security managed by great powers to security jointly designed by regional powers themselves.

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